

BW comment on

Action taken--or reasons for retaining original wording--on the two (or more?) sets of editorial suggestions ~~not~~ with which this MSS was returned to me:

1. Marginal question mark opposite sentence on UAR in introduction. I have rewritten SECTION I, dropping the sentence in question.
2. Page 4. Sentence reading "The defector...believes..material..may..originate within the Foreign DIRECTORATE of the Central Committee." Someone, in reading it, has written the word "Section" in for Directorate." The defector, as it happens, differentiates carefully between "Directorate" (Upravleniye) and the lower-echelon unit called "Section" (Otdel). I have added this fact as a parenthetical note, to keep the same misapprehension from arising on the part of later readers of the text. The unit in question, by the way, is not the Foreign Section of the CPSU which has frequently come up in connection with Free World CP affairs. This subject will be discussed in detail in a later paper on the Soviet PP effort as a whole, as portrayed in RIS defector statements.
3. Page 7. I had originally placed the comment, "for example, by addressing envelopes," in quotation marks because it is a direct quote. Apparently one reader removed the quotes and the next added the marginal note "too cryptic." There is nothing cryptic about the example, since the defector had done some of the envelope-addressing himself in just this way. The quote is fragmentary, 'tis true, but that is because it is the only fragment the defector gave on this point. I would suggest that it stand, with quotes, as I originally wrote it.
4. Page 10. Rewritten. A change in wording had been suggested at one point. The changed version missed the point I was trying to make, which served to call to my attention the fact that the original wording had not been clear. I've therefore rewritten the page and, while I was at it, expanded the defector's list of objectives to include all the 7 points he mentioned instead of only the 4 I had used in the original draft.
5. Page 14. Someone had placed question marks under the "plus NATO as target" phrase as applied to the E. German Army operations. To meet this, I have rewritten pages 10 and 11, adding the defector's own statements in greater detail than in the first draft. I think his repeated reference to NATO, plus my comment on page 13 that anti-NATO forgeries have been showing up should clear up any question as to the unit's interest in NATO.  
  
Page 14 again. Somewhere along the editorial line the phrase "directed at major target groups" had been added to my brief comment on KPD. Okay. Retained in new draft.
6. Page 25. Pencilled addition of "when a 'U.S. plots scare' was being built up in the Middle East." Okay. Retained.
7. Page 29. Word "copy" has been changed to "photographs." I've changed it ~~it~~ back to "copy" because that is what I'm talking about. We don't know in what form the copy is sent--whether as prepared mats or simply as typed or mimeographed text. The chance that it would be forwarded in photographic-copy form seems to me slight, except for facsimile-reproduction copy. In same line, "engraving blocks" had been changed to "mats." USIS has repeatedly reported on mailing of engraving blocks to subsidized newspapers, and I would suggest that we stick to their term. I've therefore crossed out both changes.
8. Page 32. Someone had pencilled in the following changes: Where the original draft had read "only four categories--Sov bloc channels, CHICOM channels, UAR channels.." the new version would read "channels in UAR." Further down on the same page, my "while the period of UAR participation" had been changed to "While the period of participation of UAR outlets"

I have retyped this page, and instead of including the above changes have added a parenthetical listing of the UAR channels which it seems to me makes sufficiently clear that these are not channels which merely happen by some whim of fate to be located within the geographic boundaries of UAR. On this point: It may be that (a) NASSER forgot he was President of the UAR when he signed the 1954 Protocols of Zion a new lease on life; (b) the Egyptian Ambassadors in the various countries all suddenly, unaccountably and simultaneously went into business for

8. themselves and circulated the ROUNTREE forgery without the knowledge of their Government; (c) the press and radio censors all blacked out at the same moment whenever one of the forgeries went over their desks; (d) the clandestine radios operated by UAR are really run by someone else. This strikes me as putting a rather heavy burden on coincidence.

Not included in this draft because I really don't see any point in belaboring the point further are the fact that NEHRU took the official UAR promotion of the ROUNTREE circular seriously enough to attack it public<sup>ly</sup> as official UAR promotion, in reply to a reporter's question during a press conference during the period when the UAR Embassy was peddling the document in New Delhi; or the apparent effort at a snow job by UAR Vice President (?--at any rate, at that time NASSER's closest adviser) Ali SABRI at the same period and on the same forgery:

Within a period of about a week these things were reported:

- a. ALI SABRI told a Cairo station source (under circumstances which led the station to comment that he may have been aware that his remarks were to be transmitted to the U. S. Govt) that the editor of AL AHRAM had received the ROUNTREE forgery through the mail (anonymously) and had surfaced it as authentic, only as a circulation stunt. NASSER knew nothing about it until it had been published, and was very angry at the AL AHRAM editor for using the forgery.
- b. The same ALI SABRI told an Asian diplomat that the same document "had been obtained in Baghdad, by means unknown" to SABRI.
- c. The Egyptian Ambassadors in 3 countries were circulating the document among other diplomatic missions, as authentic.

It might also be added--although I don't personally think it should be necessary--that on some of the Egyptian press replay I do not have complete reports because my info is taken from periodic FBIS summaries which stated only "the Cairo press," "all the Cairo papers," etc., rather than naming specific papers.

Also not mentioned, for the double reason that it postdates this paper and that it might be unnecessarily embarrassing for this agency, is the attitude of "good, clean conspiratorial fun" on NASSER's part which ROOSEVELT [REDACTED] reported as 25X1A2c characterizing his Oct 58 interview with NASSER concerning the "secret U.S. documents --true or false--which were then receiving Page 1 play in all Cairo and Cairo-influenced public-info media. NASSER, in this interview, identified the point from which this set of "secret documents" was reaching the press: his own desk.

I have rewritten parts of Section V--see in particular page 32--in an effort to make clear another point which has a direct bearing on the role of UAR as an entity in the surfacing-replay pattern. This is that (except for the 1 ANTARA instance) ALL non-Bloc surfacing and reply has taken place in newspapers which are notorious as Bloc propaganda vehicles--except for the supposedly Govt-controlled press of the UAR, which gives them widespread and enthusiastic play.

9. Side "A" of the attached long-hand note. Same BW comment as in "8" above. Side "B" of same note. On "1" see additions made on page 12. On "2" see additions in pages 15-18 of the draft.
10. The other long-hand note (also attached) reads:
  - a. "I. possible that a para might be inserted on the relationship between this effort and the general Soviet strategy at home or abroad."

BW comment: each of the forgery campaigns so far observed has been obviously and unsubtly a part of the current propaganda lines of the moment. This fact is stated in the former Section III-2, which I have now made a part of Section I instead. I have given therein 2 examples, and referred the reader to the chart to do his own cogitating on the rest. This could be treated in greater detail, by fitting each forgery into its place in the general propaganda and agitation program--but I really think all it would add would be pages to the length of the MSS (I'd like to keep the thing as short as possible because I know from my own experience and the comments

10. a. cont.

I still hear from friends on the country desks that the likelihood of any staff study being read at desk or field level is in inverse ratio to its length. When an overburdened field or desk case officer does take time out to read a study it is because his work of the moment absolutely requires some factual background in that subject. Limitations on his time necessitate his skimming through the thing to get at its factual content as quickly as possible. He feels, rightly or otherwise, that he's fully capable of doing his own theorizing once he has the facts, and he's not apt to be exactly respectful of efforts by types sitting at hq desks to do it for him.)

b. "II-A. Para 5--comments--requires some additional work."

BW comment: Since the only thing we really know on this point is that we have no Sov defector reports of recent date, I've incorporated that comment (in effect) into the text and dropped the rest of the comment entirely. See just above for reason.

c. "II-B. Para 3--comments needed."

BW comment: Like what? We have so few reports of any kind on this topic that the only comment which seems really warranted is (to the field stations) "Get with it and dig up some info." The section is factually thin, and my own reaction is that it should remain so, to point up the need for more info, rather than be padded with comment that would make it look more impressive than the state of our factual info warrants.

d. "III--suggest Section VI be consolidated with III. III needs more on the 'message' and the thesis in VI can be incorporated into a final 'comment' section under II."

BW comment: On re-reading the MSS, I've consolidated VI ~~section~~ with Section I instead, and have moved the former Section II comment on "message " to Section I also. See note in 10-a above on my own reaction to trying to do too much in the way of comment at this point.

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